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dulings with their creditors. Once news of a country's
rescheduling became known, investors in that country
were swift to precipitate in the flight of their own
capital too.
This sequence prompted the realisation that developed
nations need to maintain uninterrupted flow of
financing toward the developing countries. In the
autumn of 1985 the then US Secretary of the Treasury
announced the so-called 'Baker Initiative' in which he
stressed the importance for debtor countries to be
seriously engaged in their economic restructuring
measures while he called for creditors to be flexible in
providing neu' money to an extent that would permit
debtors to sustain growth. The Japanese government
accepted the initiative positively as one that addressed
the issue rightly; i.e. making a dynamic approach
placing an emphasis on enabling the debtors'
economies to be active and helping them return to the
reproductive spiral. To date, this dynamic approach
has not changed as the mainstay in Japan's debt
strategy, in the belief that developing economies have
a fair chance to attain a path of self-sustaining growth
if they follow the lessons particularly of the Newly
Industrialising Economies (NIEs) which proved their
potentials by achieving and maintaining healthy and,
indeed, remarkable growth through raising export-
oriented industries.
1f there was a weakness in Mr. Baker's concept, it was
perhaps in the degree of expectation and the selection
of method for the commercial banks' tolerance in
providing new money while putting up bad-debts
provisions for the same debtors. The 'New Baker
Initiative' of late 1987 encouraged the use of new
techniques; e.g. debt-equity swap and debt-debt
conversion, etc. It was an attempt to broaden the
choice of applicable means and to tap resources in
addition to the conventional form of new money. The
proposal made in 1988 by Mr. K. Miyazawa, then
Minister of Finance of Japan, was based on a similar
approach. He drew up a three-point plan calling for
agreement between the indebted country and the
IMF on a medium-term structural adjustment
programme, for which an Expanded Financing
Facility (of the IMF) would be made available
providing the base for two accompanying actions; i.e.
increased financial flows from both multilateral-
and bilateral-institutions, and
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Introduction
Japan, having grown tobe a major figure in the world
economic scene and having persistent current account
surpluses, and now determined to realign its economy
toward one in better international harmony and to
assume a relevant role in the multilateral efforts to
re-establish the world's stability and growth, takes the
contemporary debt issue as an important area where it
should address its care and resources most positively,
not for the benefit of only a few (nationality-, industry-,
and entity-wise) but in the broadest possible global
context. This paper intends mainly to discuss how its
official efforts are being done and how an agency
which plays a major part in such efforts acts. It does
not represent the official view either of the Export-
Import Bank or of the Government of Japan but
purely that of the author, where opinions are offered.
The Contemporary Debt Issue
Is It Just a Question of How the Existing Debts
be Dealt With?
In retrospect, the debt problem of developing
countries had the most crucial stage in the 1970s -
more specifically after the 1973 'oil crisis'. The abrupt
increase in oil prices brought to the non-oil producing
developing countries a drastic increase oftheir current
account deficits, and the developed countries, also
plunging into adverse balance of payments, were able
to allow only a reduced flow of their official funds,
more of which would otherwise have gone to
compensate for the developing countries' widened
deficits. The 'oil money' deposited with private money
centre banks enabled a dramatic increase of
commercial loans, notably syndicated loans on a
floating interest rate basis to occur, and that in turn
enabled the developing countries' undwindling
appetite for investment to be met. The amount of
private source funds borrowed by developing
countries shot up from US$3.Obn a year (average)
during 197 1-73 to US$ 13.8 bn a year during 1974-76.
The subsequent rise in dollar interest rates, together
with the shift of major commercial lenders' attitude
toward more conservative balance sheets, pushed the
developing country debtors toward the shorter-term
finance that was available or to negotiated resche-
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(3) splitting the existing obligations to private
creditors into two; one being converted tnto bonds and
the other rescheduled, both supported by the ¡MF-
controlled special reserve account set up by the debtor
as collateral (or 'credit enhancement'). The 'Brady
Initiative', announced in March 1989, turned out to
have much in common with this Miyazawa Proposal.
In parallel to such evolution, there were on-going
efforts by the government of Japan to accelerate the
increase of its Official Development Assistance - a
medium-term plan to increase it to an equivalent of
1 per cent of GNP, or to US$50 bn, within a five year-
period, shortened from the original seven years, and in
May 1987 there came 'Emergency Measures', an
announcement comprising principally the 6,000 bn
yen-worth of measures to stimulate domestic demand
on the one hand and a programme to have US$20 b&
of the accumulated current account surpluses
rechannelled (recycled) to the developing areas in the
world on the other. The latter, named the 'Recycling
Programme', has become one major and yet unique
source of new money in the context of international
efforts to tackle the world debt problem.
Japan's Fund Recycling Programme
The First Round
As already said, the programme had a size of
US$3Obn to be implemented from the three years
ending with Japanese fiscal year 1989. It was decided
that: (a) the recycled money should take the form of
loans, except for the part made by way of the
government's direct contribution to the multilateral
development banks (MDBs), (b) the entire funds
provided should be fully untied - their uses not tied to
purchases of goods and services from Japan, (e) in
providing public funds under this programme, private
funds should be encouraged to come with them so that
the whole recycling effect could be enhanced, and
(d) its implementation be aimed at giving its effect as
pin-pointedly and as soon as possible.
The $30 bn is classified into the following four basic
categories by mode of implementation (Reclassified
by the author. Each allocated amount shown is a
minimum target).
Category-A $8 bn: direct support to MDBs, e.g.
capital contributions and subscriptions
to the IBRD, ADB and IADB,
supplemental assistance ensuring
MDBs' smooth issuance of bonds in the
Tokyo capital market, etc.
Category-B $9 bn: loans made by way of co-
lt has Eiter become known as $30 hn programme, counting-in also a
$10 hn programme that had been effected immediately prior to the
comprehensive Eniergency Economic Mcasures. This $30 hn
roughly coincides with the si/e of the negative net floss of capital
from developing countries to the developed n 986.
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financing with MDBs. This is further
split into two; i.e.
Bi: $6 bn handled by the Export-
Import Bank of Japan, and
B-2: $3 bn handled by the Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund
(Japan's aid-loan window).
Category-C $3 bn: loans provided by the Export-
Import Bank of Japan. not in co-
financing with the MDBs. It includes
also the bank's partial purchase of
bonds issued by foreign public entities.
Category-D (Non-Classified)
$l0bn: establishing 'Japan Special
Fund' with the World Bank (approx.
$20 bn), subscriptions to MDBs' capital
replenishment (IADB, Asian Develop-
ment Fund; approx. $3.9 bn), loan to
the ¡MF (approx. $3.6 bn), etc.
As seen above, except for the part handled directly by
the government itself, the programme's imple-
mentation has been commissioned to two govern-
mental institutions, the Export-Import Bank of Japan
(JEXIM) and the Overseas Economic Cooperation
Fund (OECF). While the OECF's responsibility is
easily identifiable as Category B-2 (more than $3 bn),
the JEXIM was originally designated to handle a
minimum aggregate of$9bn (Categories B-1 and C)
and later took charge of providing a SDR 2.2 bn loan
(US$3.0 bn-equivalent) to the ¡MF for its Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which falls
under Category D.
Where, then, are these funds actually to be applied? A
part of the programme, Categories A and D, goes to
the MDBs for their repletion of operational resources,
be it to their ordinary capital resources or certain
funds set aside for special operations. Categories B
and C are applied to the selected priority projects
and/or the most imminent structural adjustment
policy packages of developing countries and areas. In
the programme's operation, particularly in the latter
(the so-called policy based lending = PBL), it is
recognised that the application of funds to the most
objectively needed areas often requires special efforts
to do it correctly, for example inducing recipients to
choose a difficult and occasionally unpopular project!
policy option, ensuring the consistent and exact
execution of the agreed project/policy, and, by no
means less importantly, ensuring the use of funds tobe
in a truly untied manner.2 For these reasons and
because Japan's bilateral agencies wish to avoid any
appearance of domestic intervention, co-financing
and co-working with MDBs is found to be realistic
and, indeed, considerably helpful.
Sometimes questions are raised regarding the use of
For this reason the .TEXIM entered a cooperation agreement with
Crown Agents of the UK in August 1989.
the JEXIM as a major player in implementing the
programme. Many such questions are based on an
understandable yet incorrect comprehension of the
character of the bank; i.e. it would be reasonable to
expect JEXIM tobe similar to the many export import
banks in the world which are preoccupied with the
task of promoting the respective nation's exports. If
this view were correct, there would be no conceivable
reason for the JEXIM to be involved in this Recycling
Programme other than the concealed expectation that
the programme would be effectively helpful to Japan's
further exports. However, JEXIM is substantially
different from many similarly named institutions in
other countries for it has long been operating not only
export credit but also other actual functions; i.e.
import credit (traditionally financing natural resource
development overseas and, lately, offering a pro-
motional facility for manufactured imports: use of
credit therefore is not linked to Japanese goods and
services), overseas investment credit (financing
Japanese direct investment overseas, particularly
toward developing countries; untied to Japanese
exports) and it has indeed a legal provision3 under
which it has been making loans to overseas borrowers
for their necessities to import supplies freely from
anywhere in the world provided that such import were
for specifically agreed projects - 'untied loans'. The
bank has thus been acting as a multi-function long-
term lender, not only for the cause of Japanese export.
It had a good reason therefore to be chosen to play the
main role in the Recycling Programme, dealing with
developing countries' development financing. At the
same time, however, there are areas under the
programme that the bank is not so familiar with; e.g.
dealing with the lower-income developing countries
(those often called the 'Pure IDA Countries') and,
especially, the basic infrastructural projects in these
countries; and therefore those countries and types of
projects are set aside to be handled by the OECF.
The Extended Round
InJuly l989,just prior to the 'Arch Summit' and when
the Recycling Programme was more than 90 per cent
accomplished in terms of concrete commitments with
eight months left in the programme period, the
Government of Japan announced the expansion of the
ongoing programme and an extension of the period.
The extended programme was given an aggregate of
'more than $65 bn' in size and a programme period of
five years toward end-FYI991 (inclusive of the
original $30 bn for the three years). The incremental
$35 bn is classified into the following three categories
(Category names correspond to those of the original
Programme, and this classification was redone by the
author for readers' ease).
Category A $14.5 bn (government)
Article t8-8 of the banks statute.
Category B, C $16.Obn (JEXIM/OECF loans)
Category D $4.5 bn: JEXIM's loans specially
made in parallel to the medium-term
facility of the IMF.
Notable in this new, stepped-up programme is its
inclusion of a pledge of $4.5 bn 'parallel lending' to
accompany the IMF's medium-term facility, which
would be provided when a medium-term structural
adjustment programme is agreed upon with the debtor
as part of the 'Brady Initiative' (or the 'New Debt
Strategy') announced just a few months before. Under
the New Debt Strategy-based packages to help Mexico
and the Philippines, the JEXIM has committed
$1,000 mn- and $300 mn-equivalent respectively as
loans in parallel with the IMF credits (the former, in
addition to the JEXIM's $1.05 bn loan in co-financing
with the World Bank). It should be remembered,
however, that even in such New Debt Strategy
operations the JEXIM's untied loans cannot be made
as a resource with which the recipient can 'buy-back'
or otherwise dispose of its existing debts but can be
provided only to -finance the debtor countries'
ordinary imports (excluding arms and a few other
specifically negative-listed items) in accordance with
the bank's statutory restriction.
Conclusion - Still a Long Way to Go
Aside from the above outline of Japan's official
initiative in injecting net additional financial resources,
there is a positive recognition of the constructive role
that foreign direct investment can play in the broad
context of the debt strategy. It becomes more evident
when we take this foreign direct investment into
account that the success of these debt strategies relies
upon how the debtor countries endeavour to create an
environment of confidence which will be required to
attract new loans and foreign investment. The debt
reduction scheme, although it has finally been
admitted into the latest debt strategy, is the last
concession that commercial bankers can offer, and
can give only a marginal solution to the whole
magnitude of the debt problems of developing
economies in the world. It is a persistent fear that such
a concession might cause a moral hazard discouraging
those countries which are seriously and therefore
painfully struggling to restructure their economies.
Should such countries as Indonesia, Turkey, Colombia,
etc., among others, who are exerting all their powers to
resist the external debt burden and to meet existing
obligations, fail to keep doing so, it will mean not only
that all past efforts concerning those countries will go
down the drain but also that the international
financing system will end up carrying more insolvent
assets than it can bear. Thus, one should always
remember the needs of these better performing
countries, keeping financial flows going to them and
providing them with as favourable an environment as
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possible - particularly in keeping the interest rates of
key international currencies low.
As for the countries whose external debt problems
have been revealed, both the debtor countries and
their creditors should avoid taking a short-sighted
view simply to evade present debt burdens. They need
a longer perspective in order to build up a structure
that will enable the economy to expand after the
restrained, equilibrium-aimed measurcs. These can be
coped with only by a dynamic approach by the
creditors. and with the presence of willing donors.
There has been and still will be the so-called 'Vicious
Circle ofPovertv' in many developing economies; i.e. a
low level of standard of living causing a low rate of
domestic savings, then a low rate of domestic
investment that allows only low productivity, thus
bringing about yet lower living standards - a
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mechanism which obliges the economy to resort to
external financing when an investment becomes
necessary, and thus is likely to cause the external debt
servicing burden to grow. Altogether, the new debt
strategies have a long way to go, in pain and with
patience for at least some of those involved, on case by
case bases - a way which cannot and should not be
avoided under present circumstances. Japan is
determined to bear its share, and is calling for others to
do so, while the JEXIM is meeting the challenge of
dealing with a great number of requests from
interested governments and institutions concerning its
untied loans under the Recycling Programme. Such a
volume of work occasionally requires even the bank to
make organisational and institutional adjustments in
addition to maintaining its inevitable closer vigilance
as a bank over its own asset profile.
